Studying MCS package design through managers’ incremental control choices by Sutton, NC & Brown, DA
 
 




 and David A. Brown
2 
1
 Accounting Discipline Group, University of Technology Sydney, Australia 
Email: Nicole.Sutton@uts.edu.au 
2




Corresponding author at Accounting Discipline Group, University of Technology Sydney 
PO Box 123 
Broadway NSW 2007, Australia. 
Email: Nicole.Sutton@uts.edu.au 
Tel: +61 2 9514 3285 
Fax: +61 2 9514 3669 
 
WORKING PAPER as of 18
th
 of July 2016 






Studying MCS package design through managers’ incremental control choices 
Abstract 
Aware of the dangers of studying control elements in isolation, many management control 
systems (MCS) researchers try to explain and observe of the design of packages of control in 
aggregate, using various approaches to capture the ‘complete’ picture of management control. 
However such approaches are challenging to conceptualise, conduct and communicate. In this 
paper we offer an alternative entry point to studying the design of MCS packages, by recognising 
that they will be the result of choices made by individual managers, who, we propose, design 
incremental control solutions to mitigate and manage the perceived potential for control 
problems. Not only is this relation – between a perceived control problem potential and an 
incremental control solution – relatively simple to observe; it also provides the starting point for 
a series of useful questions, which if pursued by future research, may complement existing 
approaches to studying the design of MCS packages in organisations.    
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Studying MCS package design through managers’ incremental control choices 
1. Introduction 
For over thirty years, accounting researchers have recognised the need to study management 
control systems (MCS) as a ‘package’ (Abernethy & Chua 1996; Daft & Macintosh 1984; Dent 
1990; Fisher 1995; Otley & Berry 1980). This recognition is based on an awareness that if inter-
related controls are examined in isolation of each other, then studies risk producing partial, 
inconsistent, piecemeal or spurious results (Fisher 1995 Chenhall 2003 Flamholtz, Das & Tsui 
1985; Malmi & Brown 2008 Abernethy & Brownell 1997). In response, there has been 
considerable effort to study organisations’ MCS holistically, whereby researchers have used 
various strategies to develop comprehensive inventories of controls and to explain how control 
elements relate to one another, to their organisational contexts and to organisational outcomes. 
However, while the intent to capture a ‘complete’ picture of management control is an 
admirable, if not ambitious objective, it also presents several challenges in conceptualising, 
conducting and communicating MCS research. The objective of this paper is to explore whether 
an alternative approach to studying MCS packages is possible; one that still considers the 
multiplicity and interactivity of management controls, but without the onus of studying them in 
their entirety. 
Our starting point is entertaining the notion is that in their pursuit of completeness, package 
researchers may have been too hasty in disregarding the value of studying individual elements or 
smaller subsets of controls (Grabner & Moers 2013). After all, MCS packages will consist of 
different control elements, developed by different people, at different times, with different 
purposes in mind (Ferreira & Otley 2009; Otley 2016; Tessier & Otley 2012). Therefore, it 
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seems feasible, even meaningful, to study MCS packages through the control choices made by 
individual managers, provided that we are precise about the process how choices are made; the 
substantive nature of what those choices are; and, of course, how individual choices aggregate to 
form an overall package of control. 
In this paper, we propose of some initial conceptualisations addressing these issues, based on 
some practical assumptions about the decision scenarios faced by individual managers’ at the 
micro-level of organisations (Granlund & Lukka 1998). For example, given the multiplicity of 
people who can influence the design of an organisation’s MCS, as well as managers’ own 
cognitive constraints, it is unlikely that all control choices will occur simultaneously at a single, 
discrete point in time (Brown, Malmi & Booth 2015; Fisher 1995; Malmi & Brown 2008; Otley 
2016; Simon 1957). Rather control patterns will emerge incrementally in a process of ‘ongoing 
elaboration’ (Hopwood 1987). In addition, we characterise managers’ control choices as an 
activity of problem-solving, whereby they design control solutions to mitigate and manage the 
perceived potential for control problems. As a consequence, individual choices aggregate across 
an organisation as multiple managers attend to common or alternative control problems; 
furthermore, control choices aggregate through time, as each successive incremental control 
solution influences managers’ future perceptions of the potential for control problems.  
By proposing this incremental micro-level view of MCS packages, we respond to Otley ’s (2016) 
call for new ways of investigating MCS packages. In prioritising the study of individual 
managers’ choices we offer future research a pragmatic way to adopt a ‘package approach’ 
without the necessity of capturing a ‘complete’ picture of management control. Perhaps more 
significantly, we do not see studying managers’ own micro-level accounts as contradictory to 
existing holistic approaches. Instead we suggest that it opens a series of useful questions - about 
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the types and origins of managers’ perceptions of potential control problems; the nature and 
reasons for selecting control solutions; and, how these choices and perceptions may change over 
time - which may complement and ideally extend macro-level theories and approaches to 
studying the design of MCS packages in organisations.    
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we provide an overview of 
prevailing MCS packages approaches by reviewing the reasons why it is necessary to study MCS 
as a package and the strategies researchers have used to address these concerns. Most of these 
approaches are designed to capture a holistic, aggregate picture of organisations’ management 
control, which in itself presents several challenges in conceptualising, conducting and 
communicating MCS research.  Therefore, in Section 3, we present an alternative approach built 
from the simple, intuitive idea that MCS packages comprise of many elements designed through 
a series of incremental choices made by multiple managers over time. In Section 4, we then 
elaborate the empirical and conceptual opportunities to build on and complement existing 
conceptual approaches to explaining MCS in organisations. Finally, the paper concludes in 
Section 5. 
2. Existing approaches to studying MCS packages: trying to capture the complete 
picture 
A MCS package can be conceived of as the array of mechanisms, devices, practices and systems 
which ensure employees make decisions and behave in ways that contribute to the achievement 
of an organisation’s goals (Abernethy & Chua 1996; Flamholtz 1983; Flamholtz, Das & Tsui 
1985; Malmi & Brown 2008; Otley & Berry 1980). Packages are characterised, rather obviously, 
by the presence of multiple control elements, such as types of planning, measurement, 
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administrative, socio-ideological or reward-based controls (Malmi & Brown 2008).
1
 However, 
more than that, the elements within a package are connected through various inter-relationships. 
Some controls may exist completely independently; others may act as substitutes for each other; 
and others may be mutually reinforcing, designed to be ‘internally consistent’ by operating 
together to achieve similar ends (Abernethy & Chua 1996; Chenhall & Moers 2015; Grabner & 
Moers 2013; Davila 2005; Otley 2016). These interrelationships (or lack thereof) are significant 
insofar as they help describe the architecture and operation of an MCS package, and 
consequently explain in what circumstances it may be used and with what effects (Bedford & 
Malmi 2015; Malmi & Brown 2008).  
2.1 Why study MCS as a package? 
Many scholars, having recognised the existence of MCS packages in organisations, have been 
critical of ‘reductionist’ approaches that study controls in isolation from one another (Fisher 
1995; Grabner & Moers 2013; Malmi & Brown 2008; Otley 1980). They raise several different 
concerns which form the foundation of advocacy for ‘package’ approaches to studying MCS. 
At a very basic level, there is a need to accurately portray how managers’ enact control in 
organisations. If managers use multiple MCS, then a package approach is obviously necessary in 
to develop faithful accounts of management control (Abernethy & Brownell 1997; Anderson et 
al. 2014; Fisher 1995). It also serves as a risk management strategy that protects researchers from 
the danger of wrongfully assuming, a priori, which mechanisms will be important in a particular 
setting. Given the variety of control options at managers’ disposal, it would seem prudent to 
investigate a comprehensive range of MCS to mitigate the risk of overlooking mechanisms 
                                                 
1
 This is just one way of conceptualising the different types of MCS. Other well-known frameworks include those of  
Ferreira and Otley (2009); Flamholtz (1996); Merchant and Van der Stede (2012); Ouchi (1977, 1979, 1980); 
Simons (1995).   
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central to managers’ efforts to control. This also allows researchers to remain open to the 
discovery of unique, novel or otherwise unexpected control practices (Ahrens & Chapman 2004). 
For example, researchers have contributed to streams concerning the management control of 
innovation (Davila 2000; Jørgensen & Messner 2010) or social enterprises (Chenhall, Hall & 
Smith 2010) by showing the role of more ‘programmed’ MCS, which beforehand had been 
considered of little benefit in those types of settings. Furthermore, a reductionist approach 
potentially limits our understanding of how controls operate to the pre-defined categories within 
MCS frameworks (Davila 2005).
2
 Managers may use MCS together in systematic subsystems 
(Brown, Malmi & Booth 2015; Macintosh & Daft 1987), patterns (Van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman 2000) or configurations (Bedford & Malmi 2015; Bedford & Sandelin 2015); this is 
only revealed by observing how multiple mechanisms operate simultaneously. 
Ignoring the existence and nature of relationships between controls also undermines our 
understanding of why MCS are used. For example, within a contingency perspective, a failure to 
recognise inter-dependent operation of two or more control elements could lead to erroneous 
conclusions about the association between controls and organizational contextual factors 
(Chenhall 2003; Fisher 1995). More so, the existence of certain MCS may influence the selection 
of others (Davila 2005). For example, certain controls are chosen to ensure the overall package 
has ‘internal consistence’ (Abernethy & Chua 1996; Grabner & Moers 2013; Johansson & 
Siverbo 2011). Alternatively two or more control elements may be chosen to create dynamic 
tension or to balance one another (Mundy 2010; Simons 1995). Also, there may be pertinent 
                                                 
2
 An excellent counter example is the case by Alvesson and Karreman (2004) who show the complex 
interrelationship in the operation of socio- and technocratic forms control; so much so that bureaucratic and output 
elements (e.g. performance measurement, incentives, hierarchical structures) could be considered hidden sources of 
socio-ideological control. As the authors argue, this questions “common ideas on the existence of pure and 
alternative forms of control and the assumption that technocratic and socio-ideological controls are mutually 
exclusive and function in different organizations and situations” (Alvesson & Karreman 2004, p.442). 
6 
 
reasons why an organisation would opt for a more loosely coordinated package of controls; 
separate systems may be required to attend to conflicting objectives or control problems (Dekker 
2004; Mundy 2010); or to manage activities over different time frames or organisational levels. 
Overlooking interrelationships may also cause researchers to make ill-informed judgements 
about the effectiveness of MCS. Some control elements share complementarities, meaning that 
the level of their ‘performance’ is dependent upon their simultaneous operation (Grabner & 
Moers 2013 Milgrom & Roberts 1995). Likewise, as managers may use MCS combinations to 
achieve certain objectives, it would seem more appropriate to evaluate and compare the 
effectiveness of combinations or sub-systems rather than single control elements. In addition, it 
is only by studying a range of mechanisms across multiple settings that we can understand if 
managers use the different MCS (or MCS combinations) to achieve the same outcomes, i.e. to 
observe substitute (Abernethy & Chua 1996; Dent 1990; Fisher 1995 or equifinal relations 
(Flamholtz, Das & Tsui 1985; Gerdin 2005; Sandelin 2008).  
Finally, the types of outcomes from different MCS are not necessarily homogenous; rather MCS 
produce a wide range of effects (Luft & Shields 2003). As each MCS may play a 
disproportionate role in influencing different outcomes, a package approach would appear 
necessary to unpick the complex web of relations attributing each MCS with their own effect. 
2.2 Holistic approaches to studying MCS packages 
In charactering what it means to adopt a ‘package approach’, it would appear that studying 
multiple control elements would be a necessary but insufficient condition. Although providing a 
comprehensive ‘inventory’ of MCS reduces the risk of omitting an important control element, 
package approaches also involve some consideration of how controls may be interrelated 
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(Nelson & Machin 1976). Within existing literature, researchers who have adopted this ‘package 
thinking’ mindset, have by and large, aimed to study MCS holistically. This is evident in how 
they have prioritised a concern for ‘completeness’ in their conceptual and empirical strategies.  
Conceptually, holism is reflected in the development of MCS typologies (e.g. Malmi & Brown 
2008; Merchant & Van der Stede 2012; Simons 1995) or what Caglio and Ditillo (2008, p. 866) 
describe as “exhaustive taxonomies of comprehensive patterns different kinds of controls”. The 
aim of these frameworks is to account for, describe, categorise all the possible types of MCS 
found in an organisation. Studies typically select, apply and if necessary extend these 
frameworks; and are pressed to provide suitable justification for partial applications of these 
frameworks (Chenhall & Moers 2015).  
Empirically, package researchers typically have observed MCS through case studies or cross-
sectional surveys.
3
 Case studies, which most often focus on a single organisational setting, 
observe MCS mechanisms through the collection of data from interviews with managers, internal 
documents, observation, which are analysed by developing rich accounts of the operation of 
MCS within their particular organisational context. These include, for example, in-depth single 
case studies that show the detail of how controls interact and influence behaviour (e.g. Alvesson 
& Karreman 2004 Chenhall, Hall & Smith 2010); longitudinal case studies showing how 
packages develop and evolve over time (e.g. Abernethy & Chua 1996; Sandelin 2008) or more 
explanatory comparative case that reveal patterns of about MCS within and between 
organisational sites (e.g. Sutton & Brown 2016). Survey researchers have developed 
sophisticated instruments to gather responses from a large cross-section of organisations. These 
                                                 
3
 A third empirical strategy that is being more widely adopted is cross-sectional field studies, where researchers  
collect a combination of qualitative and quantitative information from managers across a sample of organisations 
(e.g.Phua, Abernethy & Lillis 2011) 
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responses have been analysed using factor analysis and regression (e.g. Auzair & Langfield-
Smith 2005; Chenhall, Kallunki & Silvola 2011); although more recently researchers have used a 
variety of configurational methods (Gerdin & Greve 2004). These include cluster analysis, to 
understand characteristics of groups of organisations (e.g. Auzair 2015; Bedford & Malmi 2015; 
Johansson & Siverbo 2011); profile deviation analysis (PDA), that compare pre-defined ideal 
types with configurations in practice and identify performance implications of that deviation (e.g. 
Bedford & Malmi 2015); and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) (e.g. Bedford & Sandelin 
2015) that compares multiple cases and considers the interaction between control practices and 
outcomes. 
2.3 Challenges in capturing the ‘complete’ picture’ 
As valuable as these contributions have been in providing comprehensive accounts and 
explanations of MCS combinations, taking a holistic package approach presents a range of 
difficulties to researchers which make these types of studies considerably challenging to 
conceptualise, conduct and communicate.  
In the conceptual stages, researchers are confronted with the need to justify their selection of 
what MCS elements they will study, and which to omit (Chenhall & Moers 2015). As Bedford 
and Malmi (2015) argue the extensiveness of MCS mechanisms makes construct selection 
difficult, whereby researchers, without a clear sense of which items should be prioritised, need to 
balance parsimony with comprehensiveness in terms of the categories of control they study.  
The data collection required to capture the entirety of an organisation’s MCS package also quite 
daunting. It is often quite time consuming, although it is also often difficult to predict ex ante 
exactly how much empirical observation will be required to gain a complete picture of the 
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control configuration. This means that researchers often need to develop long, detailed survey 
instruments, or spend significant periods in the field until they reach ‘saturation’ (Eisenhardt 
1989). This may also affect potential research sites, reducing their willingness to respond or 
participate in a study. There are also concerns about how to gain insight into an organisation’s 
entire control package: it is unlikely that a single respondent or interviewee will have knowledge 
of all the components, their relations and their effects (Malmi & Brown 2008). Furthermore, 
because of the presence of legacy or redundant systems, researchers need to find ways to 
disentangle the existence of MCS from their actual use. 
In their analysis, researchers need to find ways to transform and classify the mechanisms and 
relations that exist in practice into more abstract constructs from the MCS literature. There are 
difficulties in then inferring relations between the MCS combinations and their context, and also 
the effects of different combinations (Bedford & Malmi 2015; Bedford & Sandelin 2015; Gerdin 
& Greve 2004). Also, given the mass of empirical material package studies typically encompass, 
researchers face a formidable the challenge of striking a balance in specificity or accuracy in 
their analysis with broader relevance of explanation (Chapman 1997).  
Finally, package studies are notoriously difficult to communicate, particularly within the bounds 
of academic journal articles (Malmi & Brown 2008). Perhaps the most significant 
communication challenge is being able to describe the detail of the observed packages, yet at the 
same time, move beyond ‘mere description’, and also provide explanations and worthy 
theoretical contributions. Furthermore, as researchers are using more novel techniques, there is 
an added requirement to describe, explain and justify their methods to both reviewers and 
readers, as credible approaches (e.g. Bedford & Sandelin 2015).  
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3. An alternative approach to studying MCS packages: the role of managers’ design 
choices  
Given these challenges, one wonders if there is an alternative way to study MCS packages that 
still considers the multiplicity and interactivity of controls, but without the onus to study them in 
their entirety. We propose that such an approach is possible by acknowledging, rather simply, 
that our challenges in studying MCS packages likely parallel managers’ difficulties in designing 
them. Therefore, in this section we develop an alternative research strategy inspired by 
individual managers’ own design control choices (Flamholtz, Das & Tsui 1985; Grabner & 
Moers 2013), which presumably, when aggregated, comprise an organisation’s MCS package.
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There are three interrelated considerations shaping our initial conceptualisation of these micro-
level design choices: first, the process by which control choices are made; second, their 
substantive nature; and third, how individual control choices aggregate to form an organisation’s 
MCS package. 
3.1 The process of MCS choices: incremental  
If we acknowledge that organisation’ control packages is made up of different combinations of 
control elements, some of which will be intentionally and tightly coupled, some less coordinated 
or operating completely independently of one another, how can we describe the processes by 
                                                 
4
 Our approach is not dissimilar to that proposed by Grabner and Moers (2013), who advocate for studying the 
micro-level - at the level of ‘systems’ rather than ‘packages’ -  in order to understand the relations between 
management control ‘practices’. They propose an analytical model explicating an individual manager’s decision 
scenario in selecting interdependent practices. Our approach, described further in this section, differs in at least three 
respects. First, is the centrality of manager’s perception of control problems (section 3.2); although Grabner and 
Moers (2013) identify control problems as a consideration in empirical analysis, it is not quite clear how this relates 
to their formal models. Second, we have an incremental view of control choices; whereas Grabner and Moers (2013) 
focus on non-sequential  complementarities, i.e. where practices have bi-directional performance effects and choices 
to be made at one point of time by a single decision maker. Third, rather than developing predictive model 
managers’ decision scenarios, we instead give primacy to a managers own accounts. An interesting area for future 
research is to examine the degree to which it is possible to bridge accounts with formal models. We will return to 
this issue in section 4. 
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which these configurations, combinations or packages are designed? Much existing MCS 
literature builds from assumptions from contingency theory; this posits that control structures 
remain static until such a point that they become so misaligned with organisational contingencies 
as to warrant a wholesale change to the archetype to achieve fit once more (Donaldson 2001). 
However, this depiction of periodic, punctuated adaptations sits at odds with our broader 
understanding of management accounting change (Nixon & Burns 2005). Furthermore, it seems 
problematic if we acknowledge that managers may lack the necessary cognitive and 
organisational capacities to design and implement entire MCS configurations at a single point in 
time (Brown, Malmi & Booth 2015; Fisher 1995; Malmi & Brown 2008; Otley 2016; Simon 
1957). 
Delving a little deeper, MCS packages are unlikely to emerge at a singular, holistic, discrete 
point in time, because of inherent cognitive bounds to managers’ decision making (Simon 1957). 
Although they may  have ‘feasible foresight’ and intention to act rationally, by their inherent 
nature, human beings cannot know or predict all future contingencies; thus, managers are 
“intendedly rational, but only limitedly so” (Simon 1957, p. xxiv). By assuming ‘bounded 
rationality’, we recognise managers do not have infinite resources to search for all possible 
alternatives (ranging from a single control element to a theoretically infinite combination of 
controls); to evaluate how each design alternative may interact with the organizational context; 
to anticipate the consequences of all possible control combinations, particularly those involving 
complex inter-relationships between control elements. These cognitive bounds introduce limits 
to the complexity of a design decision made by any single individual, necessitating them to make 
subsequent or supplementary choices at a future point in time.  
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In addition, unless an organisation is small or highly centralised, there is rarely a single 
omniscient designer; instead, there are many. Various control elements are developed by 
different people, at different times, with different purposes in mind (Ferreira & Otley 2009; 
Otley 2016).
5
 They are dispersed throughout the organisation, operating in different subunits, at 
different hierarchical levels, adapting ‘global’ systems and creating local MCS (Granlund & 
Lukka 1998).  The implication of this multiplicity of organisational members with discretion 
over MCS design is that no one person has the agency to make wholesale changes to an 
organisation’s entire configuration of control (Grabner & Moers 2013; Otley 2016).  
Therefore, an individual manager’s design choices will be incremental, in the sense that 
cognitive and organisational constraints will compromise their ability to make singular, once-off, 
holistic ‘package’ designs; instead, managers will make a series design choices over time, each 
building on the next.  
3.2 The nature of MCS choices: problem-solving 
Our second consideration concerns how to describe the substantive nature of managers’ control 
choices. Obviously this requires some level of abstraction, as it is impossible to describe the 
nuance of the multitude of control choices made by managers in organisations. Nonetheless, one 
possibility is to view the design of MCS through the lens of ‘control problems’ and ‘control 
solutions’. This conceptual approach has several advantages which lend it to studying MCS 
packages; however, some adaptation is required to translate it to the level of an individual 
manager’s control choices.   
                                                 
5
 With increased size, complexity, functional specialisation, and external turbulence there is a need for 
decentralisation of decision rights over operational activities to lower-level managers; similarly, it seems necessary 
to decentralise the rights to adapt organisational control elements. 
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‘Control problems’ and ‘control solutions’ are the two central constructs of a conceptual 
approach used by researchers to predict associations between context-specific imperatives for 
control and their respective control responses (Caglio & Ditillo 2008; Vosselman & Meer-
Kooistra 2009; Vosselman 2012). In this view, a control problem describes the reasons for “why 
observed control patterns or control structures exist” (Vosselman 2012, p.5); some need for 
MCS, which if unmet would presumably result in negative consequences for the organisation. 
Correspondingly, a control solution reflects the combination of various control elements, such as 
systems, structures and devices that form ‘stable responses’ to address a given control problem 
(Anderson & Dekker 2010; Caglio & Ditillo 2008; Vosselman & Meer-Kooistra 2009; 
Vosselman 2012). Owing to its rationalist, instrumental origins (Vosselman & Meer-Kooistra 
2009), researchers tend to expect some sort of alignment, either in the long term or on average, 
between control problems, which vary in their severity, and the types or intensity of control 
solutions, which vary in their relative cost (Johansson & Siverbo 2011). 
There are two appealing aspects of framing manager’s control choices through the lens of control 
problems and solution. First is the flexibility of the notion of ‘control solutions’, which 
accommodates some of the concerns of package advocate. In their seminal review, Caglio and 
Ditillo (2008) conceive of ‘control solutions’ at varying levels of analysis and breadths of scope, 
ranging from single cost accounting techniques; various MCS; to entire control patterns or 
archetypes. Control solutions can thus comprise of multiple control elements, and also that it can 
describe managerial responses at different organisational levels.  Furthermore, by focusing our 
attention on the central imperatives for control, researchers are challenged to consider how 
managers may use different control elements in combination to address the same underlying 
control problem (Brown, Malmi & Booth 2015; Caglio & Ditillo 2008; Dekker 2004; Flamholtz 
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1983; Flamholtz, Das & Tsui 1985; Grabner & Moers 2013; Malmi & Brown 2008; Otley 
1980).
6
 The second appealing aspect of this approach is its intuitive ‘problem-solving’ logic, 
which, through the notion of ‘control problems’, elucidate practical concerns that drive MCS 
choices.
7
 Control problem-based explanations include, for example, a manager’s desire to 
motivate behaviour, to coordinate activity or to provide information necessary for decision-
making (Flamholtz 1996; Merchant & Van der Stede 2012 Brown, Malmi & Booth 2015 Mundy 
2010); these appear to resonate with our attempt to describe individual managerial control 
choices.  
However, as it stands, the logic and constructs of control problems and solutions have 
predominantly been used to explain management control at macro-levels, such as the general 
propensity of certain control patterns observed across a population of organisational sites. In 
order to frame our description of individual managers’ control choices at the micro-level within 
organisations, several conceptual modifications may be warranted. 
The first, relatively minor modification relates to expected scope of the control solution. 
Although some, such as Vosselman (2012), argue that alignment between control problems and 
solutions is achieved by the deliberate, rational decision making of a central human actor, in light 
of the multitude of managers and the constraints on their choices (see Section 3.1), it seems 
necessary to temper this assumption. Also, this implies that all control solutions embody high 
levels of intentionality and agency on the part of managers, (i.e. none are created by more 
                                                 
6
 This does not imply that more typical contingency-based approach prevents the study the multiple or even inter-
dependent control elements (Grabner & Moers 2013); however,  there has been a tendency for researchers using 
contingency approaches to study control elements in isolation from one another (Chenhall 2003; Dent 1990; Fisher 
1995; Malmi & Brown 2008; Otley 1980; Otley 2016). 
7
 We can trace this view of MCS design as problem-solving as early as the work of Ansari (1977, p. 101), who 
prioritised the perspective and concerns of the designer, and described the existence of ‘design problems’ that were 
“generic and common to all echelons of an organization”. 
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passive, regulatory or accidental means), and also that control problems are only ‘solved’ 
through the actions and responses of management (i.e. latent structures or systems play no part in 
addressing control concerns). As a consequence, we suggest it is more useful to focus on their 
‘incremental control solutions’.  
The second, more major modification concerns our use of the notion of a ‘control problem’. 
Although at a macro-level there may be cross-sectional associations between control problems 
and solutions, it is unlikely that the ‘control problem’ itself will trigger managers’ control 
responses. For one, ‘objective’, exogenous control problems might simply not be that obvious. 
They will be less salient, at least temporarily, whenever managers have achieved some degree of 
resolution. Furthermore, managers are not simply reactive, myopic or passive agents, waiting for 
control problems to arise; rather, contingent on their experience and foresight, they can anticipate 
potential control problems and design control solutions in advance (Neumann 2010)
8
.  That is, 
whilst some management controls are ‘reactive’, others can be ‘proactive’, where “the controls 
are designed to prevent problems before the organization suffers any adverse effects on 
performance” (Merchant & Van der Stede 2012, pp. 5-6).
9
 Thus, if we assume managers can be 
proactive, then control solutions will not necessarily be triggered by a realised ‘clear’ control 
problem or lower performance (cf. Donaldson 2001).
10
 Instead, we propose that control choices 
                                                 
8
 This assumption of ‘foreseeable foresight’ is important: without it we would not expect managers to anticipate 
hazards nor to develop mitigating control responses in the first place (Williamson 1996). 
9
 Naturally, we expect there will be variation in managers’ awareness of control risks, with more astute managers 
proactively mitigating anticipated control problems, whilst others ignore or overlook control risks even as they 
become realised as dysfunctional effects for the organisation. We will return to this issue in Section 4.   
10
 This proactive view of differs from the traditional contingency perspective, which posits that change only will 
occur once negative performance effects have been realised. For example, Donaldson (2001, p.15) 
states:“...organizations fail to make needed adaptive change until their performance has deteriorated substantially, so 
that there is a clear problem to be solved…As long as the organization maintains a level of performance that is at or 
above the satisficing level…managerial decision making is not engaged”. 
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will be prompted by managers’ perceptions of the potential for control problems (Dekker 2008; 
Nicholson, Jones & Espenlaub 2006).  
3.3 Pulling it all together: the incremental control choices that form MCS packages 
Pulling these insights together, we propose that it is possible to study the design of elements 
within a control package by examining managers individual control choices, specifically the 
choice of an incremental control solution in response to a perceived potential control problem. 
We propose that these choices, when aggregated, form the organisation’s MCS package. Further, 
we suggest that aggregation may occur in at least three ways. 
First, control choices will aggregate when managers respond to alternative control problems. 
Existing research reveals that different types of control problems tend to be associated with 
alternative management controls (Dekker 2004; Gulati & Singh 1998). This fits with the general 
notion that it is difficult for a single control configuration to satisfactorily attend to the need to 
ensure goal congruent behaviour and whilst simultaneously providing sufficient information to 
mitigate uncertainty and aide decision making (Brown, Malmi & Booth 2015; Davila 2000). 
Therefore MCS packages will comprise of different controls, or combinations of controls that 
managers have chosen to address alternative control problems (Brown, Malmi & Booth 2015; 
Grabner & Moers 2013).  
Second, control choices will aggregate through the choices made by multiple managers across an 
organisation. Different managers, at different hierarchical levels, in different organisational units, 
responding to common or separate potential control problems will each make incremental control 
solutions that together comprise the organisation’s entire package of control (Ferreira & Otley 
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2009). In this sense, the organisation’s MCS package will represent the sum result of all the 
control choices made up to a given point in time (Boland Jr, Sharma & Afonso 2008). 
The third, and perhaps most significant way control choices will aggregate is through time. At 
the level of an individual manager, the implementation of an incremental control solution may 
shape their future perceptions of control problem potential; thus, through time, a manager 
attending to the same underlying control problem, will ‘trial and error’ different control 
elements, building different combinations to address the potential for that control problem. This 
temporal effect is reflected in Boland Jr, Sharma and Afonso (2008, p. 901), who argue that:  
“…Our ideas about what the system is, how it came to be, what its missions are, how its cultures 
operate, why its routines are the way they are, its current situation and trajectory, etc., are all 
ways in which the history of the decomposed firm is manifest to us at a given moment in time. 
Designing its management control system takes place within this understanding, and while not 
always perfect, that pre-understanding of the system is part of the problem space for the logic 
of its management control design…” (emphasis added) 
To put it another way, unless a manager is in a rare situation where they encounter a truly 
emerging control problem, (e.g. in early phases of a start-up), then their perceptions of its 
potential will be shaped by, amongst other things, their consideration the adequacy of pre-
existing controls and structures  (Malmi & Brown 2008; Otley 2016; Grabner & Moers 2013; 
Sandino 2007; Sutton & Brown 2016).  
Significantly, these three different ways choices aggregate are not mutually exclusive, but rather 
likely co-exist to create a complex web of interrelationships between control choices. For 
example, pre-existing control structures may be the result of a manager’s own prior decisions, 
but also other managers’ choices. Unless each control system designer operates in a completely 
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demarcated domain (e.g. in a standalone subunit that operates in isolation), control decisions 
made by one manager influence, impinge or shape the control choices of others (Strauss, Nevries 
& Weber 2013). Furthermore, pre-existing control structures may not necessarily have been 
designed to address a manager’s focal control concern, but may still otherwise influence their 
perception of it occurring. Clearly control choices do not necessarily have to be fully coordinated 
for them to still be inter-related.
11
 These choices will inter-relate as each adjustment or addition 
to controls will influence a manager’s own future control choices, and also the control choices 
made by other organisational members. 
4. Implications of studying incremental control choices 
Studying the relation between a perceived control problem potential and an incremental control 
solution offers future researchers of MCS packages some pragmatic empirical advantages 
compared to the more holistic approaches. However, an incremental approach is not necessarily 
contradictory to prevailing research; rather, taking this micro-level view may open some useful 
conceptual questions, that if pursued, could not only be informed by current constructs, but 
potentially complement and extend our existing macro-level conceptualisations of the design of 
MCS packages.   
4.1 Empirical advantages of focusing on incremental control choices 
From an empirical design perspective, a natural starting point for future research would be 
simply to study the individual control choices made by managers. This would entail directly 
observing the changes managers make to control arrangements, and collecting their accounts for 
                                                 
 
11
 This is crucial, as to view individual control choices as independent from one another would imply a return to 
reductionist approach, and thus invite the concerns raised in Section 2.1. 
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why they made such choices. Empirical material could be collected through open-ended survey 
instruments or better yet, by conducting first-hand interviews with individual managers.  
In addition, researchers should ideally incorporate some longitudinal element into their research 
designs. This is important not only to be able to establish some degree of cause and effect 
between a perceived problem and response, but also to be able to observe and capture the 
incremental change in control arrangements. One approach might be to identify a recent 
adjustment to MCS and ask managers to retrospectively explain their rationality for why this 
occurred. A perhaps even stronger approach would be to first gather managers’ perceptions about 
a given control scenario, observe how they respond, and then follow-up to ask about how they 
perceive the effect of the incremental control change. These temporal lags between perceptions 
and choice need not be long; in fact they likely would be quite brief, as the intent of this 
approach is to study the accumulation of many small-scale changes made to control 
configurations, rather than larger, long-term configuration-level patterns over the long term. 
This incremental approach has several pragmatic advantages. Perhaps most obviously, the focal 
relation - between a manager’s perception of potential control problem and an incremental 
control solution – is relatively simple for researchers to access. Also, as the unit of analysis is a 
choice made by an individual, it is completely appropriate for researchers to gather data from 
single respondents, which alleviates the imposition of more complex or lengthy data collection 
processes. In addition, reducing the scope of analysis is likely to make communication of the 
design and results easier. 
4.2 Opening up some useful conceptual questions 
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The central challenge of an incremental approach will likely be in the latter analysis and 
extrapolation phases of projects. Researchers will need to find ways to be able to relate or 
abstract from managerial accounts to MCS constructs and explanations. We explore some of the 
possibilities of how they might approach this by exploring a series of further research questions.  
4.2.1 What are the types of perceived control problems? 
Dating back to Anthony (1952), researchers have been using the term ‘control problem’ to 
explicate reasons for why control systems are selected, designed and used within organisations; 
however, closer examination of the literature reveals that it is hardly settled in its definition or 
usage.
12
 By surveying managers in different hierarchical levels and organisational settings about 
their reasons for making adjustments to control we can gain further clarity about the nature of 
control problems, and extend the way we use them in our theorising about MCS.  
An area requiring clarification, for instance, is the types and classification of control problems. 
Many researchers, for example, refer to ‘the control problem’ of MCS as the general need to 
influence organizational actors to behave in ways which contribute to the achievement of an 
organization’s goal (e.g. Anthony 1965; Czarniawska-Joerges 1988; Flamholtz, Das & Tsui 
1985; Malmi & Brown 2008; Otley 1994). Some have broken this down further to ascribe 
control systems more distinct organisational roles; whilst there is obvious overlap in these 
categorisations there is still variation.
13
 Whilst the somewhat illusive notion of ‘control problem’ 
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 There is also slippage in the exact wording used, with researchers also describing ‘control concerns’, ‘control 
considerations’ ‘design problems’ or ‘control hazards’  
13
 For example, Flamholtz (1996) decomposes the control problem into four ‘functions of control’: to motivate 
people to make goal congruent decisions and actions; to coordinate the efforts of different organisational subunits; to 
provide performance information; and to implement planning and strategy. In comparison, Merchant and Van der 
Stede (2012), first delineate between control problem avoidance strategies (e.g. outsourcing, centralisation, 
automation) that limit the exposure to behavioural problems, before then decomposing the control problem of 
behavioural alignment into three types: lack of proper direction, lack of motivation, and personal limitations. Most 
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has been used with more consistency in the specific domain of inter-firm MCS (e.g. Caglio & 
Ditillo 2008; Dekker 2004, 2008; Gulati & Singh 1998; Håkansson & Lind 2006; Johansson & 
Siverbo 2011; Neumann 2010; Nicholson, Jones & Espenlaub 2006; Vosselman 2012)
14
, there 
are still idiosyncrasies in how the types are categorised.
15
 
Both intra- and inter-firm MCS streams of research could benefit from efforts to collect and 
analyse managers’ own accounts about why they make certain design choices. From these 
accounts we can infer their imperatives for incremental changes in MCS, and relate these 
rationales to our existing categories, which could be clarified and extended. In addition, existing 
categories have been limited to rather functionalist, efficiency-seeking reasons for MCS design; 
there remains scope to expand the subset of commonly studied control problems to consider 
other imperatives not yet captured by these frameworks.  
Researchers could also explore and clarify, through discussions with managers in practice, what 
other dimensions may be useful, besides their substantive type, in categorising control problems. 
That is, what dimensions may be meaningful in explaining variation in managers’ decision 
making about control. For example, problems may also differ in terms of their timing, i.e. when 
they occur, or their relative scope, ranging from a problem that is endemic across the 
                                                                                                                                                             
recently Brown, Malmi and Booth (2015) propose a five-way categorisation: lack of direction, unwanted actions, 
ensuring effort, personal limitations and lack of appropriate information. 
14
 This may have been made feasible be the frequent use of a common theoretical lens (i.e. transaction cost 
economics), but also perhaps because the inter-firm setting forces researchers to consider how and why controls are 
used when the conventional imperatives of ensuring internal employees’ behaviour cannot be so easily assumed 
(Hopwood 1996). 
15
 Most studies use Das and Teng’s distinction between ‘relational risk’ and ‘performance risk’ in strategic alliances 
(Das & Teng 1996, 1998, 2001), to conceive of least two types of control problems: the imperative to align the 
interests autonomous partners who may otherwise behave opportunistically; and the need to ensure effective 
execution of activities occurring across organizational boundaries  (Caglio & Ditillo 2008; Dekker 2004; Gulati & 
Singh 1998). However, once again there is some variation in the precise categorisation of inter-firm control problem 
types. Whereas both Caglio & Ditillo (2008) and Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman (2006) propose a three-way 
split of inter-organizational control problems into coordination, appropriation and cooperation, others simply 




organisation to problem that is more idiosyncratic to a specific set of activities (Neumann 2010; 
Sutton & Brown 2016).  
4.2.2 What affects managers’ perceptions of perceived risk of control problems 
Having established the broad range of control problem types, researchers could then examine 
whether there are systematic influences on how managers’ perceive the potential for these to 
occur. The value of pursuing this line of enquiry would be to work backwards from managers’ 
accounts, to compare these influences to our existing conceptions of control problems, 
specifically the notion of residual risk (Anderson et al. 2014; Anderson, Dekker & Van den 
Abbeele 2016; Ding, Dekker & Groot 2013), and potentially to the broader set of contextual 
factors researchers have tried to link to MCS design (Chenhall 2003; Luft & Shields 2003).  
Existing conceptions of control problems are often based on the assumption that the severity of a 
given control problem varies with the parameters of certain antecedent factors (Caglio & Ditillo 
2008; Dekker 2004). For example, in the inter-firm setting, researchers propose that the risk of 
partner opportunism (cooperation or appropriation control problems) is higher in the context of 
high asset specificity, uncertainty, dependence or lower competition (Dekker 2004, 2008; 
Johansson & Siverbo 2011; Speklé 2001); or that coordination control problems are more severe 
for activities that are more complex and have higher task interdependence (Dekker 2004, 2008). 
Researchers also recognise that this combination of contextual factors tend to describe some 
latent level of ‘ex ante’ risk, which is then conditioned by pre-existing control systems or 
structural characteristics to create ‘residual risk’ (Anderson & Dekker 2005; Anderson, Dekker 
& Van den Abbeele 2016; Dekker 2008; Johansson & Siverbo 2011). These studies typically 
measure for residual risk using the error term of two-stage regression models, that represents the 
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deviation from a predicted ‘efficient’ control choice, given the parameters of certain antecedent 
variables (i.e. given the ‘ex ante risk’ of the control problem). However, there is a danger that 
managers’ perceive the potential of control problems in a different way from researchers’ 
predictive models. For example, in order to predict an ‘efficient’ control choice researchers rely 
on relative cross-sectional survey data about antecedent factors and control elements; it seems 
questionable whether managers have access to this relative data (collected across multiple 
organisations), let alone compute residual risk in a similar fashion to researchers. Most recently, 
a study by Anderson, Dekker and Van den Abbeele (2016) surveyed managers perceptions of 
risk in strategic alliances, finding that while managers perception of risk correlated with their 
residual estimation, it was not perfect, indicating that these two variables are distinct.
16
 
Careful analysis of managerial accounts for making certain MCS choices, coupled with 
systematic examination of the context of those accounts (e.g. the presence of certain 
organisational characteristics, the existence of other MCS), could provide a way to interrogate 
and extend our models of ex ante and residual risk. Working backwards, researchers could 
unpick the influences managers’ perceptions, and compare these to the components of theoretical 
models. In addition, by examining cross-sectional and temporal variation in managerial accounts, 
researchers may also be able to explore the role of other factors, such as expertise or change in 
organisational performance, in modifying their awareness of the potential for control problems. 
4.2.3 How can we characterise incremental control solutions? 
                                                 
16
 In addition, they showed that managers perceptions appeared to correlate more strongly with the residual 
estimation that simply the contextual factors alone (i.e. with ‘residual risk’ rather than ‘ex ante risk), providing some 
support for the notion that pre-existing control structures and systems shape managers’  perceptions of the potential 
for control problems (Anderson, Dekker & Van den Abbeele 2016). 
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As discussed earlier, control solutions have been conceived at different levels of analysis (Caglio 
& Ditillo 2008), from entire structural archetypes or patterns of control (e.g. Speklé 2001; Van 
der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000), various combinations of individual MCS (e.g. Dekker 
2004; Neumann 2010), to specific contractual elements (e.g. Anderson & Dekker 2005; Ding, 
Dekker & Groot 2013). However, what still remains to be explored is how we might characterise 
incremental control solutions.  
If managers choose to adopt a new control element or combination of elements then our existing 
frameworks of MCS, which describe types of mechanisms will likely be sufficient.
17
 However, 
managers’ responses may also involve modifications or extensions to pre-existing MCS; 
dismantling of dysfunctional MCS; or the use of ‘control avoidance’ strategies (Merchant & Van 
der Stede 2012). If this is the case, it would seem we may need more extensive and systematic 
ways of describing these other sorts of control solutions (Davila 2005). In addition, researchers 
could also explore the degree to which managers consciously build control solutions to be 
interrelated with existing systems. 
4.2.4 How systematic are managers’ selection of control solutions to perceived control 
problems? 
With sufficient observations across a wide range of settings, researchers could then start to 
examine the robustness of the central relation itself, by investigating how systematic the 
association managers control choices are in response to perceived control problems. This 
particular question lends itself to large scale survey questionnaires; however, once patterns of 
association (or lack thereof) have been observed, there remains scope to use follow-up interviews 
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 Although as discussed in Section 2.1 researchers should remain open to the discover of new or unexpected modes 
of control.  
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to explain these results. In particular, one area they could focus on would be to explain the lack 
of systematic associations. Such cases may be rich sites to explore the role of heterogeneity in 
managers’ cognition and rationalities. Alternatively, interviews may reveal that while managers 
share similar views about their desired control response, they may differ in their organisational 
agency. 
4.2.5 How does a manager’s perception of risk change over time?  
In Section 3.3 we proposed that implementation of incremental control solutions subsequently 
modify managers’ perception of the potential control problems, which in turn shapes future 
decisions about the design of additional control elements. Future researchers could explore the 
degree to which this is actually the case, and then whether there are systematic patterns in how 
perceptions changes.  
For example, this incremental building of control elements within an organisation, raises a 
question as to what end? Do managers, for example, add different control elements with the aim 
of continually reducing the risk control problems over time? An efficiency-seeking logic would 
posit that they would continue this process until all possible control options have been exhausted 
and all that remains is some minimal residual control loss (Sutton & Brown 2016)
18
. A series of 
control system choices may also end if managers make a trade-off decision regarding the ‘cost of 
control’, when the cost of perceived control problem becomes less than the expected additional 
cost of implementing another control element (Anderson, Dekker & Van den Abbeele 2016).  
A particularly rich site for exploring changes in managers’ perceptions over time may be the 
control choices in early-stage organisations (Davila 2005; Davila, Foster & Li 2009). In these 
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 This is akin to the ‘residual loss’ in agency theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976).  
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types of organisations, not only may there be fewer managers making control choices 
simultaneously, but also the influence of pre-existing control solutions on managers’ perceptions 
of the potential for control problems is likely to be diminished, at least initially. Therefore these 
may provide ‘cleaner’ empirical opportunities to observe the types and sources of perceived 
control problems, separate from the confounding effects control solutions (Sandino 2007). Thus 
one might expect managers’ initial perceptions to be closer to models of ‘ex ante risk’. In 
addition, by tracking managers’ choices over time, researchers can observe the degree to which 
perceptions of control problem potential are influenced by incremental control choices, and 
whether their perceptions become more closely associated with  models of ‘residual risk’. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have proposed an alternative strategy to study MCS packages that centres on the 
incremental control choices made by individual managers, who design control solutions to 
mitigate and manage the perceived potential for control problems. Furthermore, we propose that 
the aggregation of these choices, across different managers and also through time, forms the 
basis of an organisation’s MCS package.  
This strategy responds to Otley ’s (2016) call for new ways of investigating MCS packages, by 
providing an alternative way for conceiving the design of MCS that accommodates the existence 
of multiple control elements, without presuming a singular holistic design. Instead, the design of 
controls can be depicted as an emergent ongoing process, where managers anticipate likely 
control risks and experiment with combinations of control elements. As we have elaborated, this 
more incremental approach potentially opens opportunities for future research to examine MCS 
combinations through the patterns of short-term micro-level choices, which may not only be 
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readily accessible but also meaningful in understanding the package-level patterns we observe at 
the macro-level in the long-term.   
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